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Climate Change and the Challenges to
Democracy
MARCELLO DI PAOLA* & DALE JAMIESON**
This Article explores the uneasy interaction between climate change and democracy, particularly liberal democracy. Its central claim is that climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene—this new epoch into which no
earthly entity, process, or system escapes the reach and influence of human activity—expose and exacerbate existing
vulnerabilities in democratic theory and practice, particularly in their currently dominant liberal form; and that both
democracies’ failures and their most promising attempts at
managing these problems expose democracies to significant
legitimacy challenges.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In an oft-quoted passage of a paper co-authored with Hans Suess
in 1957, climate science pioneer Roger Revelle wrote:
[H]uman beings are now carrying out a large scale
geophysical experiment of a kind that could not have
happened in the past nor be reproduced in the future.
Within a few centuries we are returning to the atmosphere and oceans the concentrated organic carbon
stored in sedimentary rocks over hundreds of millions of years.1
We are now beginning to see the implications of such an experiment.2 The unusually high quantities of greenhouse gases that have
crowded the Earth’s atmosphere during the past two centuries,
mostly due to humans’ massive utilization of fossil energy sources,
are currently at work remaking the planet.3 This may come at great
cost, as the makeover process will likely cause, among other things,
sea levels to rise; “more frequent and extreme weather events,” such
as floods, hurricanes, and droughts; widespread eco-systemic disruptions; “more sweeping epidemics; food and water shortages; and
vast and diverse ranges of second- and third-order problems (such
1
Roger Revelle & Hans E. Suess, Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between Atmosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO 2 During
the Past Decades, 9 TELLUS 18, 19 (1957).
2
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 6–7 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2015)
[hereinafter IPCC].
3
See id. at 4–7.
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as political instability and mass migrations) whose details will vary
in different places, times, and sociopolitical contexts.”4 Climate
change is, in many respects, the most dangerous experiment that humans have ever conducted.5
Despite its magnitude and gravity, climate change is only one
aspect of a larger picture. The rise in global temperature can be seen
as a sign of global transformations that are so vast and deep that they
merit the label of “epochal.”6 This is the discussion that has been
triggered by the introduction of the term “Anthropocene” into environmental discourse.7
The term “Anthropocene” was coined by limnologist Eugene
Stoermer in the 1980s, popularized by Nobel prize-winning chemist
Paul Crutzen, and came to widespread public attention in a short
article Stoermer and Crutzen published in 2000, in which they
claimed that humanity had become a major geological force on the
planet.8 In 2006, Hibbard et al. noted that since 1950, anthropogenic
biological and geological changes had been subject to a “Great Acceleration.”9 In 2011, Steffen et al. summarized the planet’s current
situation in the following way:
4
Dale W. Jamieson & Marcello Di Paola, Political Theory for the Anthropocene, in GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 254, 257 (David Held & Pietro Maffettone eds., 2016).
5
See DALE JAMIESON, REASON IN A DARK TIME: WHY THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE FAILED AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR FUTURE 1
(2014).
6
See generally Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 842, 842–43
(2011).
7
See CHRISTOPHE BONNEUIL & JEAN-BAPTISTE FRESSOZ, THE SHOCK OF
THE ANTHROPOCENE: THE EARTH, HISTORY AND US 3–4 (David Fernbach trans.,
2016); see also CHRISTIAN SCHWÄGERL, THE ANTHROPOCENE: THE HUMAN ERA
AND HOW IT SHAPES OUR PLANET 52–53 (Lucy Renner Jones trans., 2014),
https://www.synergeticpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Anthro-ReviewCopy.pdf.
8
Paul J. Crutzen & Eugene F. Stoermer, The “Anthropocene,” 41 GLOBAL
CHANGE NEWSL. 17, 17–18 (2000); see also Paul J. Crutzen, Geology of Mankind,
415 NATURE 23, 23 (2002).
9
Kathy A. Hibbard et al., Group Report: Decadal-scale Interactions of Humans and the Environment, in SUSTAINABILITY OR COLLAPSE?: AN INTEGRATED
HISTORY AND FUTURE OF PEOPLE ON EARTH 341, 342 (Robert Costanza et al. eds.,
2006). On the stratigraphic evidence for the Anthropocene, see Jan Zalasiewicz et
al., Stratigraphy of the Anthropocene, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A
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In addition to the carbon cycle, humans are (i) significantly altering several other biogeochemical, or element cycles, such as nitrogen, phosphorus and sulphur, that are fundamental to life on the Earth; (ii)
strongly modifying the terrestrial water cycle by intercepting river flow from uplands to the sea and,
through land-cover change, altering the water vapour
flow from the land to the atmosphere; and (iii) likely
driving the sixth major extinction event in Earth history. Taken together, these trends are strong evidence
that humankind, our own species, has become so
large and active that it now rivals some of the great
forces of Nature in its impact on the functioning of
the Earth system.10
However, the Anthropocene is not yet an established geological
category, and its introduction and extensive adoption in some circles
has given rise to controversy.11 This Article will not directly address
these controversies, but it will use the term because it reminds us
that climate change is not a “one off” problem but part of a systematic transformation of the planet and human relationships with nature that will continue for the foreseeable future.12 Whatever else is

1036, 1037–43 (2011). For a proposal on when the Anthropocene should be
thought to have begun, see Jan Zalasiewicz et al., When Did the Anthropocene
Begin? A Mid-Twentieth Century Boundary Level is Stratigraphically Optimal,
383 QUATERNARY INT’L 196, 197, 200–01 (2015).
10
Steffen et al., supra note 6, at 843 (internal citation omitted).
11
For a clear statement of objections on geological grounds, see generally
Stanley C. Finney & Lucy E. Edwards, The “Anthropocene” Epoch: Scientific
Decision or Political Statement?, GEOLOGICAL SOC’Y AM. TODAY, Mar.–Apr.
2016, at 4, 4, 6–9. On various conceptual controversies on the Anthropocene in
the humanities, social sciences and environmental philosophy, see generally Clive
Hamilton et al., Thinking the Anthropocene, in THE ANTHROPOCENE AND THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: RETHINKING MODERNITY IN A NEW EPOCH 1,
1–12 (Clive Hamilton et al., eds. 2015); Tom Butler, Lives Not Our Own, in
KEEPING THE WILD: AGAINST THE DOMESTICATION OF EARTH ix–xiii (George
Wuerthner et al. eds., 2014).
12
For our interventions in these controversies, see generally Jamieson & Di
Paola, supra note 4, at 256; Marcello Di Paola, Virtues for the Anthropocene, 24
ENVTL. VALUES 183, 183–86 (2015); DALE JAMIESON & BONNIE NADZAM, LOVE
IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 11–27 (2015); Dale Jamieson, The Anthropocene: Love It
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true, the world of the twenty-first century will be increasingly different from the world of our grandparents—with unprecedented
numbers of humans, rapid technological change, global interconnectedness, massive exploitation of nature, and consequent ecological degradation marking the difference.13 Each of these changes,
and their various combinations, have political dimensions and consequences and contribute to configuring novel operating spaces for
political theory.
In this Article, we explore the uneasy relationship between climate change and democracy, with special attention to its currently
dominant and most widely practiced model: liberal democracy. Our
interest is not in liberal democracies’ historical responsibilities for
climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, but rather
in the interaction between such problems and democracy.
Our central claims are that climate change and other problems
of the Anthropocene expose and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities
in democratic theory and practice, particularly in their currently
dominant liberal version, and that both democracies’ failures and
their most promising attempts at managing these problems expose
them to significant legitimacy challenges. We expect these challenges to increase as the Anthropocene intensifies.
In Part II, we analyze the twin challenges of climate change and
governance, and of democracy and representation. In Part III, we
briefly survey the history of attitudes towards democracy, showing
how recent its almost universal celebration really is. In Part IV, we
discuss democracy’s most influential current form, liberal democracy. In Part V, we sketch some of democracy’s vulnerabilities. In
Part VI, we focus on the interlocking crises of democracy and climate change. Finally, in Part VII, we draw some conclusions.
II.

THE TWIN CHALLENGES

We are living in a period in which many perceive both an environmental crisis, best exemplified in climate change, and a crisis in

or Leave It, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL
HUMANITIES 13, 13–15 (Ursula K. Heise et al. eds., 2017).
13
See generally IPCC, supra note 2, at 4–7, 95–97.
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governance.14 Climate change continues almost unabated,15 and
democratic governments are increasingly seen as ineffectual and unresponsive with respect to this problem and to a range of other problems as well.16 In order to tease out the possible relationships between the challenges of climate change and governance, we need to
appreciate each in its own terms.
A.
Climate Change and Governance
The most systematic attempts at climate governance have been
through the international system, taking nation-states as primary
agents.17 The crowning achievement has been the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which opened for signature at
the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and has been ratified by 196 states
and the European Union.18 The parties to the FCCC committed
themselves to stabilizing “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”19 In a series of statements, declarations, and agreements, “dangerous anthropogenic interference []
with the climate system” has come to be understood as a 2 degree
Celsius increase in Earth’s mean surface temperature from a late
twentieth-century baseline.20 The Earth has already warmed .8 degrees Celsius over the last thirty years; and a recent paper suggests
14

See HAYLEY STEVENSON & JOHN S. DRYZEK, DEMOCRATIZING GLOBAL
CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 3–6 (2014); Jamieson & Di Paola, supra note 4, at 270–
73.
15
See the latest data at NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information. State of the Climate: Global Climate Report, NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL.
INFO., https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/201703.
16
See Jamieson & Di Paola, supra note 4, at 274–76.
17
See generally JAMIESON, supra note 5, at 34–59 (discussing climate diplomacy).
18
Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate
Change, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Dec. 19, 2017); First Steps to a Safer Future:
Introducing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
19
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. II, opened
for signing June 4, 2012, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994).
20
Joel B. Smith et al., Assessing Dangerous Climate Change Through an
Update of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) “Reasons for
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that even if emissions were to stop immediately, we may already be
committed to a 1.5 degree Celsius warming.21 194 nations, as well
as the European Union, have signed the Paris Agreement; 171 have
ratified it, including the United States;22 and 165 have made voluntary commitments to reduce their emissions.23 Nonetheless, even if
all these commitments are kept, the Earth may still be on its way to
a 3 degree Celsius warming.24
There are many reasons why climate change is such a difficult
issue. One glaring reason is that climate change has many properties
that demonstrate that it might be “the world’s largest collective action problem.”25 No country can singularly secure the global public
good of climate stability; high-emitting rich countries do not want
developing countries to follow in their footsteps, while developing
countries want rich countries to lead in reducing emissions.26 To
make matters worse, each country wants to benefit from its own
greenhouse gas emissions while others reduce their emissions.27 To
a large extent, these behaviors simply follow from the logic of collective action: for each actor, “defection dominates cooperation, [no
matter how] others act.”28
Climate change also poses an intergenerational collective action
problem: since every generation benefits from its own emissions,

Concern,” 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 4133, 4135–36 (2008); accord What
Is Dangerous Interference with the Climate System?, IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/
publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch1s1-2-2.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2017).
21
See Thorsten Mauritsen & Robert Pincus, Letter, Committed Warming Inferred from Observations, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 652, 652–54 (2017).
22
Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php (last visited Dec. 19,
2017).
23
See Welcome to the Interim NDC Registry, NDC REGISTRY (INTERIM),
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Dec. 19,
2017).
24
See Fiona Harvey, World on Track for 3C of Warming Under Current
Global Climate Pledges, Warns UN, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/nov/03/world-on-track-for-3cof-warming-under-current-global-climate-pledges-warns-un.
25
JAMIESON, supra note 5, at 4.
26
See id. at 35–38, 45, 57.
27
See, e.g., id. at 57.
28
Id. at 99. For more on these claims, see id. at 11–61, 96–102.
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but the costs of climate change are mostly deferred to future generations, each generation has an incentive not to control its emissions.29 Furthermore, since “each generation (except the first) suffers from the emissions of previous generations, benefiting from
their own present emissions may even appear to be just compensation for what they have suffered” and “this reasoning leads to the
continuous build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere over
time.”30
These problems are even worse than they seem, as climate
change does not involve a single intra- and a single inter-generational collective action problem: jurisdictional boundaries and competing scales lead to multiple, overlapping, and hierarchically embedded collective action problems.31 A wide range of behaviors by
individuals, nations, firms, and other entities affect the climate, but
they are governed by an equally vast array of different regimes with
different mandates.32 For example, decisions about trade and intellectual property affect greenhouse gas emissions, but each area is
governed by its own legal regimes.33
This may seem abstract, but on a daily basis we witness policy
failures and dysfunctions that are driven by the same dynamics, even
when the problems are less complex than climate change—for example, when an industrial city pollutes the waters of a surrounding
area.34 Much like a city acts in the interest of its residents (who are
employed by the industry), but not of residents of surrounding areas
(who are affected by the pollution), states and especially “well-functioning democracies act in the interest of the governed rather than

29
See generally Stephen M. Gardiner, The Pure Intergenerational Problem,
86 MONIST 481, 481–85 (2003) (“Ethical issues concerning future people are usually conceived of as problems of future generations.”).
30
Dale Jamieson, The Nature of the Problem, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 47 (John S. Dryzek et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter
The Nature of the Problem].
31
See Jamieson & Di Paola, supra note 4, at 262–63.
32
See id. at 267–69.
33
See, e.g., Gladwin Isaac & Trishna Menon, When Good Intentions Are Not
Enough: Revisiting the US-India Solar Panels WTO Dispute, 10 OIDA INT’L J.
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 37, 37–38, 43 (2017) (With respect to trade, the WTO has
ruled against India’s requirement that solar panels be produced domestically,
which India argued was necessary to have low cost solar power).
34
JAMIESON, supra note 5, at 100.
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on behalf of all those whose interests are affected.”35 The benefits
from the activities that cause climate change primarily accrue to
those who are members of particular political communities, while
the costs are primarily borne by those who are not.36 In the case of
climate change, the “costs are [mostly] borne by those who live beyond the borders of the major emitters, future generations, animals,
and nature.”37
B.
Democracy and Representation
Democratically elected governments have been largely ineffective in addressing climate change, as well as a host of other global
problems and their domestic implications.38 These include (to varying degrees in different countries) pollution and biodiversity loss,
nuclear waste management, nuclear proliferation, cyber-(in)security, financial insecurity, business flight, growing wealth inequality,
public debt management, migration, intercultural integration, and
terrorist radicalization. The supranational institutions that these governments have created and supported, like the United Nations and
the European Union, have not been particularly successful in addressing these issues either.39
In many democratic countries, citizens are not only frustrated
with the relatively poor performances of their governments, but also
increasingly resentful of institutions and procedures that they perceive as inaccessible, arcane, dominated by partisan interests,
crowded with rent-seekers, and generally detached and unresponsive to their needs and interests.40
35

Id.
Id. at 136.
37
There are many other reasons why we have failed to act on climate change.
For further discussion, see generally J AMIESON, supra note 5, at 61–103.
38
Jonathan Boston & Frieder Lempp, Climate Change: Explaining and Solving the Mismatch Between Scientific Urgency and Political Inertia, 24 ACCT.,
AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 1000, 1001 (2011); See JAMIESON, supra note
5, at 100.
39
See Boston & Lempp, supra note 38, at 1000–11.
40
See generally Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/
11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-their-government/. On reasons for
popular discontent in the United States, see generally Jill Lepore, Richer and
Poorer: Accounting for Inequality, NEW YORKER (Mar. 16, 2015), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/03/16/richer-and-poorer.
36
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A democratic deficit in many self-declared democracies has vividly been put on display in cases in which majority preferences have
failed to be translated into policy. For example, in the United States,
for at least the last twenty-five years, most Americans have favored
stricter gun control laws, yet gun control laws have consistently
been weakened.41 In Italy, the outcomes of many popular referenda,
including those regarding the introduction of legal liability for magistrates (1985, 80.2% in favor) and the abolition of public funding
for political parties (1993, 90% in favor), have been ignored either
flatly or through artful reformulation of existing legislation.42
The relation between majoritarianism and democracy is complex, and it would surely be a mistake to postulate that a democracy
must enact every popular policy preference, or that every democratic
institution must be majoritarian.43 Still, it is hard to imagine a democracy that had no majoritarian governance institutions. Yet, if we
accept this thought, then the democratic status of many countries
that think of themselves as democracies is seriously in question.

41
See Guns, GALLUP NEWS, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017); Ed Pilkington, NRA: 10 Ways It Has Weakened Guncontrol Laws in the US, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2012, 2:58 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/13/nra-weakened-gun-control-laws. See
generally Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 570–
75 (2014).
42
See Davide Casati, Referendum, e Ora? I Casi di Referendum Votati (e
Ignorati), GQ ITALIA (June 14, 2011), https://www.gqitalia.it/httpredir/r.php?q=/
viral-news/articles/2011/6/referendum-cosa-cambia-ora-dopo-la-vittoria-dei-si-icasi-precedenti-dal-finanziamento-pubblico-al-nucleare-ai-ministeri-di-turismoe-agricoltura/.
43
See generally Stephen Macedo, Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1029 (2010).
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Consider, for example, the United States.44 Of the three branches
of federal government, the judicial branch is avowedly anti-majoritarian.45 Until recently, many Americans probably regarded the
presidency as a majoritarian institution despite the existence of the
Electoral College, which many people regarded as simply “rubber
stamping” the popular vote. This illusion has been shattered by the
fact that two of the last five elections resulted in the winner of the
popular vote being denied the presidency.46 This leaves the Congress as the putative majoritarian institution in the United States’
federal government.47 However, in the 2016 elections, Democrats
won 56% of the aggregate national vote in Senate races, while Republicans won 65% of the seats.48 According to a venerable American platitude, it is the House of Representatives that is “the People’s
44
The Economist reclassified the United States as a “flawed democracy” (as
opposed to a “full democracy”) in 2016, largely due to eroding public confidence
in American political institutions as documented in surveys by Gallup, Pew, and
others. See Declining Trust in Government is Denting Democracy, ECONOMIST
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/01/dailychart-20; see also Eric Zuesse, Jimmy Carter Is Correct that the U.S. Is No Longer
a Democracy, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ericzuesse/jimmy-carter-is-correct-t_b_7922788.html (last updated Aug. 3, 2016).
While most Americans today think of the United States as a democracy at least in
aspiration, the framers never took themselves to be designing a democracy in anything like the contemporary sense of the term. See infra Part III.B.
45
Except, of course, among its members. See Helen J. Knowles, Remember,
It Is the Supreme Court That Is Expounding: The Least Dangerous Branch and
Popular Constitutionalism, 41 U. DAYTON L. REV. 33, 33 (2016). A cynic with a
sense of irony might say that the Supreme Court practices a kind of “democratic
centralism.” See Terrance Ball & Richard Dagger, Politics: Democratic Centralism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/democraticcentralism (last updated Nov. 5, 2015).
46
See Michael McAuliff et al., Electoral College About to Screw Democrats
for Second Time in 20 Years, HUFFINGTON POST: POLITICS (Nov. 9, 2016, 2:00
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/democrats-popular-vote-presidential_us_582246c4e4b0aac62487dde9.
47
See Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to
Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 361, 372 (2008).
48
These statistics were calculated using data from the Cook Political Report
and Vital Statistics on Congress. See Molly E. Reynolds, Republicans in Congress
Got a Seats Bonus” This Election (Again), BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/11/22/gop-seats-bonus-in-congress/ (including the links to the Cook Political Report and Vital Statistics on
Congress).
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House”: members of the House of Representatives were the only
federal officials to be directly elected by the people in 1789 and their
charge is to represent the people of their districts rather than their
states.49 Yet, in the 2016 elections, Republicans won 48.7% of the
aggregate vote in House races but won 55.4% of the seats.50 While
much more support would be needed to defend the claim that the
United States is not a democracy, it is clear that there is currently no
reliably majoritarian institution in the federal government.51
Consider a similar example from the United Kingdom.52 In the
2017 election, the Conservatives won 42% of the aggregate vote but
49% of the parliamentary seats.53 The Liberal Democrats won 7%
of the vote but only 2% of the seats.54 According to a recent study,
Labour would have won the 2017 election under several voting systems used in other countries’ national elections that are more representative than Britain’s “First Past the Post” system.55
These results have led to a widespread perception of democratic
deficits; this has contributed to the rise of so-called “populist” movements in many liberal democratic countries, including countries in
the European Union, the United States, and others.56 These movements and their leaders oppose existing power structures in the name
49
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (now superceded by U.S. CONST. amend XII); The People of the People’s House, HISTORY,
ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
50
See Reynolds, supra note 48.
51
See Zuesse, supra note 44.
52
See, e.g., Ben Kentish, Jeremy Corbyn Could Now Be Prime Minister if
UK’s Electoral System Wasn’t ‘Broken’, Claims Study, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 21,
2017, 3:38 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbynuk-prime-minister-uk-electoral-system-broekn-first-past-post-labour-leader-theresa-may-a7905191.html.
53
JESS GARLAND & CHRIS TERRY, ELECTORAL REFORM SOCIETY, THE 2017
GENERAL ELECTION: VOLATILE VOTING, RANDOM RESULTS 11, https://www.
electoral-reform.org/uk/latest-news-and-research/publications/the-2017-generalelection-report/.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 29–35, https://www.electoral-reform.org/uk/latest-news-and-research/publications/the-2017-general-election-report/. Previous British elections
have been even worse at translating popular votes into parliamentary seats. Id.
56
For an overview of populist phenomena across continents, see CAS MUDDE
& CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
21–41, 79–96 (2017). See also JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 7–11
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of the people, portray incumbents as inept and detached from citizens’ everyday realities and needs, and advocate change by popular
demand, circumventing entrenched institutional agents and procedures.57 What is often characteristic of these leaders and movements
is a yearning for a mythologized past of popular sovereignty in
which politicians came from “the people,” citizens’ opinions were
integral to the mechanisms of governance, citizens’ needs and interests were the sole preoccupation of government, bureaucrats did not
rule, and things actually got done.58
Populism can be a powerful democratizing force, especially at
the early stage of democratization processes.59 This can be seen in
the rise of the Solidarity Labor Union in Poland, which resisted the
Soviet regime, led the transition from communism to democratic
elections, and won Poland’s democratic election of 1989. 60 It can
also be seen in the rise of the American Democratic Party, which
was founded in 1828 during the wave of Jacksonian populism.61
Populist leaders and movements typically begin their political ventures to defend groups of citizens they believe have been systematically neglected by incumbent elites.62 Thus, some describe populism
as a radical form of democracy and argue that the end of populism
would mean the end of democratic politics itself. 63
Populist leaders and movements champion the principle of popular sovereignty above all and typically defend some extreme form
(2016); David Marquand, The People is Sublime: The Long History of Populism,
From Robespierre to Trump, NEWSTATESMAN (July 24, 2017), https://www.
newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/07/people-sublime-long-history-populismrobespierre-trump.
57
Marquand, supra note 56.
58
See id.
59
See MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 56, at 79–96 (discussing populism’s democratic spirit and its role at different stages of the democratizing process).
60
See id. at 88–89; Solidarity: Polish Organization, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Solidarity (last updated Jan. 27,
2016).
61
See DAVID GRAEBER, There Never Was a West: Or, Democracy Emerges
from the Spaces in Between, in POSSIBILITIES: ESSAYS ON HIERARCHY,
REBELLION, AND DESIRE 329, 345 (2007).
62
See Marquand, supra note 56.
63
See Ernesto Laclau, Populism: What’s in a Name, in POPULISM AND THE
MIRROR OF DEMOCRACY 32, 47–49 (Francisco Panizza ed., 2005).
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of majoritarianism.64 Thus, populist movements are essentially democratic. However, they can be at odds with democracies that check
and balance, or filter and buffer, popular sovereignty through institutions, including constitutions and bills of rights; bodies of experts,
including judges, academics, and the professional press; administrative procedures, including bureaucratic procedures; partnerships
with forces from civil society, including banks and businesses; and
generally any power center not appointed by and accountable to the
majority of the people.65 As Mudde and Kaltwasser put it:
[P]opulism raises the question of who controls the
controllers. As it tends to distrust any unelected institution that limits the powers of the demos, populism can develop into a form of democratic extremism or, better said, of illiberal democracy.66
The challenge of democracy and representation can be expressed
as a dilemma that forces us to think about the very nature of democracy. Frustration with the failures of existing avowedly democratic
states is leading to a resurgence of populism, which can be seen as
a purer expression of democracy than the prevailing liberal democratic model.67 But managing the problems of the Anthropocene requires a steadiness of outlook and a long-term perspective that
seems in many ways antithetical to the populist posture. The fear is
that we may be caught between political paralysis and paroxysms of
extreme and arbitrary actions.
III.

DEMOCRACY OLD AND NEW

Dilemmas cannot always be solved. Sometimes we are fortunate
if they can be managed. First of all, however, they must be understood.
64

See MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 56, at 81.
See generally MÜLLER, supra note 56, at 56–57.
66
MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 56, at 82.
67
See McAuliff et al., supra note 46; André Munro, Populism: Political Program or Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/populism (last updated Oct. 14, 2015); Uri Friedman, What Is a Populist?,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2017/02/what-is-populist-trump/516525/.
65
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In the broadest sense, democracy can be thought of as “[t]hat
form of government in which the sovereign power resides in and is
exercised by the whole body of free citizens.”68 From its earliest
days, democracy has tilted in two different directions.69 In one direction, democracy is seen as embodying a procedure for political
decision-making.70 In the other direction, democracy is seen as embodying substantive values.71 This tension, as well as some important sources of skepticism about democracy, go back to its ancient origins in Athens.72
A.
Democracy in the Ancient World
Democracy in the substantive sense is captured in the words of
Pericles, a politician, orator, and military leader who administered
popular decisions in ancient Athens during the fifth century BC:73
Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighboring states; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favours the many
instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice
to all in their private differences; if no social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for
capacity, class considerations not being allowed to
interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the
way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom

68

Democracy, LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/democracy/
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
69
Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY
AND D IFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 21, 21 (Seyla
Benhabib ed., 1996).
70
Id. at 21–23.
71
Id.
72
See infra Part III.A.
73
See David Malcolm Lewis, Pericles, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pericles-Athenian-statesman (last updated Apr. 21, 2017).
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we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life.74
For Pericles, the principle of popular sovereignty is supported
by the principle of isonomia, or equality before the law, and enriched
by the principle of eleutheria, or individual liberty.75 Per Aristotle,
[A] basic principle of the democratic form of government is eleutheria . . . for every democracy has eleutheria as its aim. Ruling and being ruled in turn is
one element of eleutheria . . . Another is to live as
you like. For this, they say, is a function of being
free, since living not as you like is the function of a
slave.76
Isonomia and eleutheria are principles to which all contemporary liberal democrats subscribe.77 In this respect, Pericles’ democracy can be seen as an embryonic version of liberal democracy.
However, Pericles’ democracy was quite different from its liberal
descendant.78 In particular, liberal democracy adds a principle of
civil and political equality whereby all individuals are born or created as equals and should be treated as equals by others, the government, and generally in the political process.79 This principle is distinctly liberal and modern, and was absent from Pericles’ proto-liberal democracy which reflected the intense concern of its citizens
74

As reported by the historian Thucydides in 2 THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY
PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Richard Crawley trans., 2009) (431
B.C.E.), http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.html (last visited Dec. 22,
2017).
75
Robert W. Wallace, Law, Freedom, and the Concept of Citizens’ Rights in
Democratic
Athens,
in
DĒMOKRATIA:
A
CONVERSATION
ON
DEMOCRACIES, ANCIENT AND MODERN 105, 105 (Josiah Ober & Charles Hendrick eds., 1996).
76
Id.
77
See infra Part IV.
78
Jennifer Roberts, The Creation of Legacy: A Manufactured Crisis in Eighteenth-Century Thought, in ATHENIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 81, 82–83 (J. Peter Euben et al.
eds., 1994).
79
E.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). See generally Roberts, supra note 78, at 82–83.
OF
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for all “differences among individuals—differences between humans and animals, between males and females, between free people
and slaves, between men who owned property and men who did not,
and of course, between Greeks and non-Greeks.”80 Women, slaves,
and all those who were considered foreigners were excluded from
voting in Athens.81 Thus, the principles of popular sovereignty,
equality before the law, and individual liberty applied only to a fraction of the population of Pericles’ Athens.82 However, according to
many ancient commentators, such as Plato and Aristotle, that was
still far too much power in the hands of the people.83
While the Romans never adopted democracy, they invented republicanism—a mixed constitution capable of managing the tug-ofwar between “the people” and “the elites” that has been replicated
throughout Western history and is with us today.84 Tasked with governing a far greater number of people than the government in Athens, with soldiers who were often more loyal to their generals than
the state and slaves who were frequently uprising and rebelling,
Rome was forced to provide the people with some form of political
influence.85 While the Romans incorporated selected elements of
democracy in their constitution through mechanisms of representation, the Roman Senate surrounded these mechanisms with a net of
constitutional, administrative, and other constraints that effectively
and severely limited the people’s influence over legislation and policy, thus yielding a de facto oligarchy.86 Throughout the duration of
the Roman republic, most Roman rulers including the Senate, many
plebeian tribunes, and other self-appointed champions of the people,
80

Roberts, supra note 78, at 83.
Donald Kagan, Periclean Athens and Modern Democracy, AEI: POL. &
PUB. OPINION (June 8, 1993), http://www.aei.org/publication/periclean-athensand-modern-democracy/.
82
DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 19 (3d ed. 2006).
83
See id. at 17, 23–26 (discussing ancient criticisms of democracy).
84
See id. at 28.
85
See ANTONIO SANTOSUOSSO, STORMING THE HEAVENS: SOLDIERS,
EMPERORS, AND CIVILIANS IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 39–40 (2001); PHILIP
MATYSZAK, THE ENEMIES OF ROME: FROM HANNIBAL TO ATTILA THE HUN 74–
77 (2004).
86
See HELD, supra note 82, at 28. See generally GRAEBER, supra note 61, at
345. For a comprehensive treatment of the history of Roman institutions, see generally FRANK FROST ABBOTT, A HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF ROMAN
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (3d ed. 1911).
81
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did not empower the people with any authentic mechanisms of selfgovernance, but rather used the people as pawns in their own power
struggles.87
B.
Modern Democracy
Throughout history, most leaders and governments, including
the Roman senators, did not adopt Pericles’ enthusiastic view of democracy, but rather viewed it disparagingly and derogatorily as a
form of government that indicated mob rule, “political disorder, rioting, lynching, and factional violence.”88 Still, instances of democracy in the procedural sense occurred in most, if not all, cultures
across history, particularly at the local level and with respect to specific episodes of collective decision making.89 However, democracy
in the substantive sense was basically repudiated everywhere.
It was only in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries
that democracy in the substantive sense took on the positive connotation it has today.90 Still, on the ground there was not much rule of
the people.91 Even the political regime produced by the American
Revolution—and later celebrated in 1863 by Abraham Lincoln in
the Gettysburg Address as being “of the people, by the people, [and]
for the people”92—was modeled on the republic of pre-imperial
Rome rather than Pericles’ democracy: it was (and still is) a mixed
constitution that balanced monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic
elements.93 It envisioned a powerful, indirectly elected president, a

87

See MANUS I. MIDLARSKY, THE EVOLUTION OF INEQUALITY: WAR, STATE
SURVIVAL, AND DEMOCRACY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 151–52 (1999).
88
GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 330, 345.
89
See id. at 356; Francis Dupuis-Déri, The Political Power of Words: The
Birth of Pro-democratic Discourse in the Nineteenth Century in the United States
and France, 52 POL. STUD. 118, 120–23 (2004); see also Roberts, supra note 78,
at 82–83.
90
See GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 330–31; Dupuis-Déri, supra note 89, at
118; John Markoff, Where and When Was Democracy Invented?, 41 COMP. STUD.
SOC’Y & HIST. 660, 663–65 (1999).
91
See Dupuis-Déri, supra note 89, at 121.
92
Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2004, at 1335, 1335 (William A.
McGeveran et al. eds., 2004).
93
GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 345; see Ellen Meiksins Wood, Demos Versus
“We, the People”: Freedom and Democracy Ancient and Modern, in
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house representing the people, and a deliberative, indirectly elected
senate representing the states.94 As Markoff has noted, even the revolutionary elites that
called themselves democrats at the tail end of the
eighteenth century were likely to be very suspicious
of parliaments, downright hostile to competitive political parties, critical of secret ballots, uninterested
or even opposed to women’s suffrage, and sometimes tolerant of slavery.95
In addition, because modern nation-states, unlike ancient Athens
and more similarly to Rome, were far too large to be directly ruled
by their people, institutional agents were created to mediate the decisions and actions of citizens and to resolve conflicts between
them.96 These mediating agents took different forms, and democratic polities became more or less representative rather than direct.97 In most cases where the people could be said to rule at all,
they ruled only indirectly by occasionally voting for their representatives—often with unequal voting power.98 In the United States, for
DĒMOKRATIA: A CONVERSATION ON DEMOCRACIES, ANCIENT AND MODERN, supra note 75, at 121, 124–29, 131–35; see also Markoff, supra note 90, at 665.
94
GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 345; see Wood, supra note 93, at 124–29, 131–
35.
95
Markoff, supra note 90, at 661. See generally Dupuis-Déri, supra note 89,
at 120–31.
96
See Wood, supra note 93, at 124–29.
97
See id. This loss in direct control opens the door to concentration of unchecked power and rent-seeking by representatives. One solution was to fragment
power by institutional architecture, separating legislation from execution and adjudication. The idea was to restrict the authority of each branch of the government
by pitting it against the independent authority of each of the other branches. See
Peter M. Shane, Executive Branch Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: The Challenges for Conscientious Analysis, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY & POL’Y 507, 519 (2012).
Though both the Greeks and the Romans had already introduced various forms of
separation of powers in their political systems, modern democracy (especially in
the United States) made separation of powers into one of its structural cornerstones. See id. Much inspiration came from the French intellectual Montesquieu’s
theory of “checks and balances”. See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS 185–98 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., The Legal Classics Library ed. 1984)
(1748)
98
See Wood, supra note 93, at 124–29; see also McAuliff et al., supra note
46.
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example, the principle of one person/one vote was not established
until the 1960s by a series of Supreme Court decisions.99
By the nineteenth-century in the West, elected legislatures had
acquired unprecedented sway against hereditary and class lineages,
unprecedented numbers of people were enfranchised, and politicians
were increasingly forced to court small farmers and urban workers
for their votes.100 It was only at this juncture that government leaders
began to portray themselves as heirs to Pericles and speak of his
democracy as embodying an honorable ideal of public participation
rather than an incubus of violent mob rule.101
The democratic narrative became that of a political regime characterized by ordinary folks collectively managing their own affairs,
informed by an egalitarian distribution of political power, and sustained by ongoing participation.102 Whatever the case on the ground,
this narrative conquered the hearts and minds of people the world
over and has established democracy as a central political value in
the twentieth- and now the twenty-first centuries.103
IV.

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

What has most strongly powered and sustained the democratic
narrative, best reaffirmed and expanded the values of liberty and
equality that Pericles trumpeted almost two millennia earlier, and
reinforced popular demands and hopes that the democratic narrative

99

The central Supreme Court decisions are Baker v. Carr in 1962 and Reynolds v. Sims in 1964. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that challenges to legislative redistricting under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution are justiciable); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that
the Equal Protection Clause requires state legislature seats to be apportioned based
on the state’s population and must give equal weight to one vote for every one
person). Even today, voting power is highly variable depending on where one
lives. For one way of calculating voting power, see Richie Bernardo, 2016’s States
with the Most and Least Powerful Voters, WALLETHUB (Oct. 17, 2016), https://
wallethub.com/edu/how-much-is-your-vote-worth/7932/.
100
GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 345.
101
See Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers
and Ancient Theorists, 26 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 486, 487–88 (1993).
102
See the discussion of John Dewey infra Part IV.
103
See Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, 10 J. DEMOCRACY 3,
3–4, 10–16 (1999).
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would be realized in practice was the rise of the ideal of liberal democracy. While other countries had anticipated and advocated liberal democracy,104 it became especially influential in the United
States in the 1920s with the work of John Dewey.105
Dewey’s vision was of democracy as a collective experiment
conducted by citizens through informed dialogue.106 His democratic
ideal depicts citizens approaching collective governance in the open,
impartial, and empirically sensitive way that is characteristic of
modern science.107 For the experiment to succeed, citizens must be
free, educated, and (at least to some degree) self-realized.108 Democracy is not just a decision procedure, but a “way of life”:
[t]he key-note of democracy as a way of life . . . [is]
the necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the
living of men together:–which is necessary from the
standpoint of both the general social welfare and the
full development of human beings as individuals.109

104

The great precursors of liberal democracy were John Stuart Mill (1859 and
1861) and Immanuel Kant. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS,
PART I (John Ladd trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (1797); see infra text
accompanying note 110.
105
For a sharp and concise statement of Dewey’s political philosophy, see 2
JOHN DEWEY, The Public and Its Problems [hereinafter The Public and Its Problems], in JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 235, 238–39 (Jo Ann
Boydston & Bridget A. Walsh eds., 1984). For a discussion on Dewey’s role in
the development of American democracy, see generally ROBERT B. WESTBROOK,
JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ix–xviii (1991); ALAN RYAN, JOHN
DEWEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 19–34 (1995); DAVID
FOTT, JOHN DEWEY: AMERICA’S PHILOSOPHER OF DEMOCRACY 1 (1998).
106
Richard J. Bernstein, Creative Democracy—The Task Still Before Us, 21
AM. J. THEOLOGY & PHIL. 215, 217 (2000).
107
See id.
108
See id. at 217–21.
109
11 JOHN DEWEY, Democracy and Educational Administration, in JOHN
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at 217, 217–18 (Jo Ann Boydston et al.
eds., 2008). In thinking of democracy as a way of life, Dewey was following Mill
who wrote that a democratic political system makes the best use of the “moral,
intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest
effect on public affairs” and fosters the “advancement of the community . . . in
intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency” more fully than any

390

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:369

Dewey was an egalitarian, a vigorous defender of civil liberties, and
an advocate for unions and progressive public education.110 He
thought that if democracy was to succeed, it was incumbent on government to create the conditions under which it could thrive.111
Dewey’s kind of comprehensive liberalism is often regarded as
democracy’s natural home. As Pericles and Aristotle recognized,
once a value like eleutheria (individual liberty) has been accepted,
a large step has been taken towards also accepting popular sovereignty. For without popular sovereignty, individuals would be relinquishing some of their liberty to an uncontrolled power that may not,
in fact, serve their needs.
Yet liberalism and democracy are distinct intellectual traditions
with different histories, whose respective priorities do not always
overlap. As Thomas Nagel writes:
Liberalism [by which he means liberal democracy in
our sense] is the conjunction of two ideals. The first
is that of individual liberty: liberty of thought,
speech, religion, and political action; freedom from
government interference with privacy, personal life,
and the exercise of individual inclination. The second
ideal is that of a democratic society controlled by its
citizens and serving their needs . . . . To approach
either of these ideals is very difficult. To pursue both
of them inevitably results in serious dilemmas.112
Democracy’s primary commitment is to popular sovereignty, while
liberalism primarily values individual liberty.113

other political system. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 27–28 (Curren V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill
Co., Inc. 1958) (1861).
110
See Bernstein, supra note 106, at 217–18, 220. See generally James
Gouinlock, Introduction to 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, supra note 109, at ix, ix–xxxvi; John J. McDermott, Introduction to 11 JOHN
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, supra note 109, at xi, xi–xxxii.
111
See Bernstein, supra note 106 at 217, 220, 226.
112
Thomas Nagel, Libertarianism Without Foundations, 85 YALE L.J. 136,
136 (1975) (reviewing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)).
113
See CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 2–3 (2000). The work
of Daniel Bell explores the relationships between democracy, human rights, and
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The problem is that popular sovereignty can be realized at the
expense of individual liberty, and individual liberty can frustrate
popular sovereignty. These conflicts can break out in a glaring way
in cases signaled by the expression “tyranny of the majority.” 114 In
a system in which having the numbers means getting what you want,
the door is open for oppressive legislation over those who do not
have the numbers.115 Those may be the rich minority, as feared by
Aristotle, the Roman senators, and later by American President
James Madison;116 or the educated minority, as Plato and Mill suggested;117 or some ethnic and cultural minority, as the Jews of democratically constituted Nazi Germany tragically learned.118
Asian cultural traditions, illuminating respects in which they fit together and respects in which they are quite distinct and even antagonistic. See, e.g., DANIEL A.
BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA 158–
215 (2000).
114
The phrase “tyranny of the majority” was first used by John Adams. JOHN
ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1787), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 3, 63
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1851). The problem was also discussed by Edmund
Burke in Reflections on the Revolution in France, and then by John Stuart Mill in
On Liberty. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
FRANCE (1790), reprinted in 2 SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 85, 224–26
(2010); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 73, 76 (David Bromwich & George
Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859). In discussing this problem, Ayn
Rand argued that “[i]ndividual rights [should] not be subject to a public vote,” and
that “the political function of rights is precisely to protect minorities from oppression by majorities,” with the smallest minority being the individual. See AYN
RAND, Collectivized “Rights,” in THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A NEW CONCEPT
OF EGOISM 96, 99 (1964). This eminently liberal thought was a cornerstone of
Ronald Dworkin’s work. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 163–84, 223–48, 311–18 (1977).
115
Dewey’s great interlocutor, Walter Lippmann, wrote that “an election
based on the principle of majority rule is historically and practically a sublimated
and denatured civil war.” WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC 48 (Russell
Kirk ed., Transaction Publishers 1993) (1927).
116
See HELD, supra note 82, at 15–17; ABBOTT, supra note 86, at 77–80; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 280 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“If the law
allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the
respect and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his choice; and through this
imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the public representation.”).
117
See HELD, supra note 82, at 23–27; MILL, supra note 109, at 135–43.
118
See MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 56, at 83–84, 109.
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Liberal democracy’s solution to the conflict between popular
sovereignty and liberal ideals (such as liberty itself) is to construct
independent institutions whose role is to protect liberal values, often
in the form of rights to liberty of expression, property, freedom of
association, and so on.119 By adopting constitutions, bills of rights,
courts, expert bodies, administrative procedures and other mechanisms, liberal democracy protects and promotes a range of values
(including competence and efficiency) that are often neglected or
put at risk by more immediately majoritarian forms of democracy.120
These mechanisms buffer popular influence. They insulate law and
policy (at least to some extent) from the transient opinions of citizens. Ironically, and perhaps paradoxically, liberal democracy protects liberal values by limiting popular sovereignty. In this very specific but important sense, these buffering mechanisms (constitutions, bills of rights, courts, expert bodies, administrative procedures, etc.), which are part-constitutive of liberal democracy, are
themselves non-democratic.
Whatever their ironies and paradoxes, liberal democracies have
considerable strengths. One strength is their capacity to ensure that
the needs and interests of citizens are taken into consideration during
collective decision making, while at the same time providing a clear
way (i.e., majority rule) to make decisions even in the face of disagreement.121 Liberal democracies are inclusive and can be efficient,
119

See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 265–66 (James Madison) (Ian
Shapiro ed., 2009) (“It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society
against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights
of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against
this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority—that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so
many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a
majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.”).
120
For discussion of the great variation that exists among liberal democracies
with respect to these institutions, see generally HELD, supra note 82, at 1–8, 123–
256, 275–84.
121
Cf. The Public and Its Problems, supra note 105, at 364 (“The strongest
point to be made in behalf of even such rudimentary political forms as democracy
has already attained, popular voting, majority rule and so on, is that to some extent
they involve a consultation and discussion which uncover social needs and troubles.”).
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at least relative to some alternatives. In addition, liberal democracy
realizes some forms of equality; this may be because democracy is
a peaceful and fair compromise among bearers of conflicting claims,
realized by each having an equal say over decision making, 122 or
because democracy “publicly embodies the equal advancement of
the interests of the citizens of a society when there is disagreement
about how best to organize their shared life.”123 A further strength
of liberal democracy is its capacity to harness the precious resource
of diffused knowledge: the fragmentation of decisional powers that
characterize democratic regimes promotes an increase in decisional
competence of the system as a whole.124 Yet another strength of democracy is its capacity to contribute to the development and exercise
of fine human capacities including initiative, engagement, self-reliance, rational thinking, autonomy, and respect for others.125
Other strengths of democracy become apparent on the assumption that all people are (born or created) free.126 Once this idea is
accepted, democracy appears to be the only (or at least the most)
legitimate form of government. In a democracy, citizens can freely
author their own laws through collective decision-making. Considering the extent to which laws affect the lives of individuals, it is
only when individuals can be said to be the authors of such laws, as
democracy allows them to be, that individuals can really be said to
be masters of their own lives as liberalism maintains that they are
and should be.
122

See generally PETER SINGER, DEMOCRACY AND DISOBEDIENCE 30–41
(1973); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 235–39 (1999).
123
Tom Christiano, Democracy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 2.2.3 (Edward
N. Zalta ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/.
124
See generally MILL, supra note 109, at 25–28; JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC
AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL INQUIRY 171–205 (Melvin L. Rogers
ed., 2016) (1927).
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See MILL, supra note 109, at 27–30; see also Jon Elster, The Market and
the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in PHILOSOPHY AND
DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 138, 152 (Thomas Christiano ed., 2003).
126
E.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). This assumption is widely shared by liberals, but often in the breach as we see from the
existence of slavery in societies that claim to be liberal. See generally GERALD F.
GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM: AN ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND
POLITICAL THEORY 161, 162–66 (1996) (discussing the normative primacy of liberty for liberals).
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DEMOCRACY’S VULNERABILITIES

Despite these strengths, democracy in all its forms is subject to
numerous vulnerabilities. Many of these vulnerabilities were known
in the ancient world and were also discussed by modern philosophers. In Part IV, we mentioned one particular vulnerability: the risk
to individual liberty that democracy can present. In this Part, we discuss three further vulnerabilities of democracy: a lack of governance
expertise, voter ignorance, and instability.
A.
Lack of Governance Expertise
Plato saw major problems in democracy and thought that these
problems were guaranteed to drive democracies towards demagoguery and tyranny.127 His general worry was that democracy undermines governance expertise because it requires those who run for
office to develop and exercise a different set of skills than those required for good governance; namely, skills functional to the harnessing of votes to win elections.128 Metaphorically equating a polity to
a ship, a competent ruler (by which Plato meant a philosopher) to a
captain, and citizens to sailors, Plato wrote:
They throng about the captain, begging and praying
him to commit the helm to them . . . . Him who is
their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for
getting the ship out of the captain’s hands into their
own whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and
abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a goodfor-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention
to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds,
and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to
be really qualified for the command of a ship, and
that he must and will be the steerer, whether other
127
See PLATO, Despotism and the Despotic Man [hereinafter Despotism and
the Despotic Man], in THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 287, 288 (Francis Macdonald
Cornford trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1945) (1941). Plato’s classic critique of democracy is in Book VIII of The Republic. Plato, The Republic: Book VIII,
INTERNET CLASSIC ARCHIVE (last visited Dec. 18, 2017), http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.9.viii.html [hereinafter Book VIII].
128
See Christiano, supra note 123, at § 2.1.2.

2018]

CLIMATE CHANGE & THE CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY

395

people like or not—the possibility of this union of
authority with the steerer’s art has never seriously entered into their thoughts or been made part of their
calling.129
Plato had controversial and even conceited views about democracy, but here he seems to make a structural rather than ideological
point. Democracy does not ultimately require governance proficiency as a condition for running for or holding office: it only requires that offices be won by popular vote. There is no reason to
believe that those who are proficient at winning elections are proficient at governing.130
Plato also doubted the governance abilities of the people.131 He
suspected that it was not congenial to most people to engage in the
disciplined training required to understand enough of the world and
oneself to be competent self-governors.132 Ultimately, Plato thought
most people want to be left alone, attend to their business and crafts,
and enjoy themselves as they please.133 Worse still, people can be
pleased by all sorts of things in erratic and inconsistent ways. Here
is Plato’s description of “the democratic man”:
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Plato, The Republic: Book VI, INTERNET CLASSIC ARCHIVE (last visited
Dec. 18, 2017), http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.7.vi.html [hereinafter Book
VI].
130
It has become a trope in recent politics that Republicans are good at winning elections and terrible at governing, while Democrats are good at governing
but bad at winning elections. See Julia Azari, Why Republicans Can’t Govern,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 11, 2017, 5:56 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-republicans-cant-govern/; Harry Enten, Democrats Shouldn’t Count on
an Unpopular Trump to Win Back Governorships, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 2,
2016, 7:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/democrats-shouldnt-counton-an-unpopular-trump-to-win-back-governorships/.
131
See PLATO, The Philosopher King [hereinafter The Philosopher King], in
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 127, at 175, 175–263; PLATO, Democracy
and the Democratic Man [hereinafter Democracy and the Democratic Man], in
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 127, at 279, 284–86.
132
See Democracy and the Democratic Man, supra note 131, at 279, 284–86.
See generally The Philosopher King, supra note 131, at 175, 175–263.
133
This is an important theme in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. See PLATO, The
Allegory of the Cave, in THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 127, at 227, 227–
35.
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[H]e lives from day to day indulging the appetite of
the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and
strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker,
and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything,
then once more living the life of a philosopher; often
he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says
and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is
emulous of anyone who is a warrior, off he is in that
direction, or of men of business, once more in that.
His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted
existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so
he goes on.134
A people composed of such inconsistent and undisciplined individuals, Plato thought, is prone to miscalculate priorities and may
also be easily manipulated by those who have the will, ability, and
means.135 The result may be that the interests most tended to may
not be the people’s but rather those advanced by the groups or individuals best organized and equipped to perpetrate the manipulation.136
Plato may have been overly pessimistic about “the democratic
man” and unduly deterministic in predicting democracy’s inevitable
path towards demagoguery and tyranny.137 Yet even an otherwise
critical reader cannot entirely ignore the aptness of Plato’s ship metaphor when observing the current rise of populist figures or movements in contemporary liberal democracies. Much like “him who is
their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship
134

Book VIII, supra note 127.
See Democracy and the Democratic Man, supra note 131, at 279, 284–86.
See generally The Philosopher King, supra note 131, at 175, 175–263.
136
See Book VI, supra note 129. Plato had witnessed the feats of Alcibiades—
a rich, persuasive, and reckless young man––who, during the Peloponnesian war
against Sparta, convinced the Athenians to embark on the most ambitious maritime assault the city had ever attempted against Syracuse in Eastern Sicily, an ally
and main food supplier of Sparta. The expedition was a failure and marked the
beginning of Athens’ defeat in the war and overall decline. Russell Meiggs, Alcibiades, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alcibiades-Athenian-politician-and-general (last updated June 28, 2017).
137
Democracy and the Democratic Man, supra note 131, at 279–86; Despotism and the Despotic Man, supra note 127, at 287–88; Book VI, supra note 129.
135
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out of the captain’s hands into their own,” these figures or movements often present themselves as the people’s champions, are skillful in harnessing votes, rail against the current inefficacy of democratic institutions in tackling urgent problems, and boast about their
own powers while also downplaying or even denying the importance of experts for good governance.138
B.
Voter Ignorance
Another vulnerability of democracy that has worried commentators since its invention is voter ignorance. Whatever failures citizens may have with respect to governance may seem to be magnified by their high levels of ignorance.139
Plato was first in line here,140 but champions of democracy who
had a much more optimistic view of “the democratic man,” such as
John Stuart Mill, also had concerns about voter ignorance.141 While
an advocate of universal suffrage, Mill proposed that people with
university degrees and intellectually demanding jobs be given extra
votes.142 While most democrats today would recoil in horror from
such a suggestion, many democracies have in fact welcomed it in
some way. For example, until 1950, some British universities had
their own parliamentary constituencies, thus effectively allowing the
educated to vote twice—once at their university and once in their
place of residency.143 The Italian Senate still includes “life sena-
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See Book VI, supra note 129; Marquand, supra note 56.
See generally DANNY OPPENHEIMER & MIKE EDWARDS, DEMOCRACY
DESPITE ITSELF: WHY A SYSTEM THAT SHOULDN’T WORK AT ALL WORKS SO
WELL 89–90 (2012). For specific examples regarding the ignorance of Americans,
see JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & KATHERINE LEVINE EINSTEIN, DO FACTS
MATTER?: INFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 16–17
(2015).
140
Plato’s critique is echoed by Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, “Stalin was
supported by the majority of the Soviet people both because he was clever enough
to deceive them and because they were backward enough to be deceived.” ROY
MEDVEDEV, LET HISTORY JUDGE: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
STALINISM 712 (George Shriver ed., trans., 1989).
141
See MILL, supra note 109, at 127–47.
142
Id. at 135–38.
143
See Caleb Crain, The Case Against Democracy, NEW YORKER (Nov. 7,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/07/the-case-against-democracy.
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tors—who are appointed by the President of the Republic ‘for outstanding merits in the social, scientific, artistic or literary field.’”144
In the United States, voter literacy tests have never been definitively
banned, though they are not currently used in any jurisdiction.145
John Dewey took the issue of voter ignorance as a reason to insist on the central political importance of education in and for democracies, as well as of a free press that would help circulate information.146 Others took an entirely different approach. For example,
Joseph Schumpeter’s elitist theory has it that democratic political
leaders should make policy and law with little regard for citizens’
opinions and even demands, since these are fickle and incoherent.147
This effectively excludes citizens from governing and restricts their
role to confirming or rejecting political leaders—still a significant,
but clearly quite limited form of popular sovereignty.
Voter ignorance is hardly a surprise. Public choice theorists have
argued that citizens will typically not be well-informed about political issues, nor particularly motivated to gather relevant information—rationally so, given the virtually null impact of any single
vote on the outcomes of elections.148 Some political scientists and
economists, while acknowledging voter ignorance, have claimed
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Parliament, SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA, https://www.senato.it/3801(last
visited Dec. 19, 2017).
145
Historically literacy tests in the United States were used to disenfranchise
minorities, especially African-Americans. Primary Documents in American History: 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://
www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/15thamendment.html (last visited Dec. 24,
2017). Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a body of law has developed to prevent
literacy tests from being used for this purpose. See id.
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See generally The Public and Its Problems, supra note 105, 325–72;
LIPPMANN, supra note 115, at 12–29 (demonstrating skepticism that education
could remedy the ills of democracy).
147
See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 250–68 (3d ed. 1950).
148
See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238–
59 (1957); Harry Cheadle, An Expert Explains Why Your Vote Won’t Matter, VICE
(Aug. 29, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/avaek4/votersdont-know-anything-and-your-vote-wont-matter. However, in the 2018 election,
control of the Virginia House of Delegates turned on a single vote. Ian Simpson,
Democrat loses bid to overturn tie in key Virginia House race, REUTERS (Jan. 3,
2018, 1:08 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-virginia-election/democratloses-bid-to-overturn-tie-in-key-virginia-house-race-idUSKBN1ES1NP.
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that it is not a problem, as indicated by the successes of democracy.149 Various explanations have been put forward about how
voter ignorance and successful governance manage to peacefully coexist.150 Some theorists are in thrall to ideas about the “wisdom of
crowds.”151 On this view, epistemologically compromised people
make better decisions collectively than they would individually.152
Knowledge and experience does lead voters to revise their preferences.153 Moreover, how we feel about decisions made from ignorance might depend on what the alternatives are.154 In my case, what
we know from analyses of the 2016 United States presidential election is that voters’ sense of identity drove their voting behavior more
than knowledge of the issues or policy preferences anyway.155
From here, it is easy to see how voter ignorance can be seen as
a problem, one that is especially relevant to the recent rise of populist figures and movements in liberal democracies, at least insofar as
voter ignorance can be manipulated as well as fomented.156 For example, voter ignorance is manipulated when debaters rely on charisma, pathos and inflammatory rhetoric, rather than fact-based,
coolly-reasoned discourse.157 It is fomented when contestation of
the role of experts is promoted—an issue to which we shall return
in Section VI.D.
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See generally OPPENHEIMER & EDWARDS, supra note 139, at 9–38, 177–
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Vox Populi, 75 NATURE 450, 451 (1907); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF
CROWDS xi–xv, 269–71 (2004).
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and Won, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 34, 34–37 (2017).
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See id. at 63–68 (discussing the exploitation of charisma by populist figures). For a glossary of pathos-based rhetorics, see Richard Nordquist, Pathos
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C.
Instability
Thomas Hobbes identified instability as another vulnerability of
democracy.158 Indeed, Hobbes thought that democracy, though indeed a distinct form of government, was not much of an improvement upon the anarchic state of nature as it tended to replicate rather
than neutralize important drivers of the war of all against all, including competition and vanity.159 For this reason, a democracy is constantly at risk of relapsing into anarchy or turning into an “aristocracy of orators, interrupted sometimes with the temporary monarchy
of one orator.”160
Democracy fosters competition because legislating in a democracy is such an inclusive enterprise. Politicians, as well as citizens,
will tend not to feel personally responsible for the quality of legislation, insofar as no one among the voters or their representatives
singularly makes any significant difference to the outcomes of legislation.161 In this way, the concerns of citizens as well as politicians
will be deflected from the common good and instead fixed onto the
competition for power and the pursuit of partisan or private interests.162
Democracy fosters vanity because it holds out the promise that
each citizen can promote his or her own interests through the political process.163 Hobbes says that “in such great assemblies, as those
must be, whereinto every man may enter at his pleasure,” everyone
is given the hope that he may “incline and sway the assembly to [his]
own ends.”164 Because of “the desire of praise which is bred in human nature,” each citizen will indulge “the opportunity to sh[o]w
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Alan Apperley, Hobbes on Democracy, 19 POLITICS 165, 168 (1999).
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86–90, 129–37 (Richard Tuck ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press rev. student ed. 1996) (1651) [hereinafter LEVIATHAN];
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69.
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their wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence, in deliberating matters of
the greatest difficulty and moment.”165
Competition and vanity are the ingredients of political resentment.166 Democracy cannot fulfill the promise to promote the interests of each citizen through the political process.167 For in any policy
decision, only a fraction of the population—e.g., the numerical majority, with the minority discontented, or some powerful numerical
minority, with the majority discontented—will see its interests promoted by democratic rule.168 In other words, citizens of democracies
always stand a good chance of seeing their hopes frustrated. When
they feel that their hopes have been frustrated too often or too blatantly, these citizens, who are both competitive and vain, may come
to feel alienated from the outcomes of legislation or marginalized by
the political process.169 This may breed resentment towards both.170
Hobbes’ points seem relevant to the current rise of populist figures and movements in liberal democracies. These figures or movements exploit and promote an increasingly competitive factionalism.
Further, they build on real as well as perceived neglect of citizens’
interests by emphasizing the disappointments of current outcomes
and processes, while courting the related popular resentment
through vivid, visceral, and even uncivil expressions of disagreement.171 They typically attack “systems of governance with long and
opaque chains of delegation,” which they promise to overhaul.172
VI.

THE INTERLOCKING CRISES

In this Part, we highlight how the vulnerabilities of democracy
are made salient as well as exacerbated by climate change and other
problems of the Anthropocene. We also emphasize how climate
165
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Dominion, in 2 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURTY 63,
136 (William Molesworth ed., London, John Bohn 1841).
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change and other problems of the Anthropocene place democracies
that attempt to navigate them in a particularly impervious Scylla and
Charybdis-like situation.173 The Scylla is ineffective policy; the
Charybdis is some relaxation of the core democratic principle of
popular sovereignty. Both options seem nearly guaranteed to trigger
significant legitimacy challenges to liberal democratic systems.
Traditionally, two important sources of democratic legitimacy
have been beneficial consequences, in the utilitarian tradition, and
consent, in the social contract tradition.174 Whatever else may count
as beneficial consequences, the capacity to solve problems that
threaten the physical and social security of citizens is a central and
important source of democratic legitimacy.175 Call this the “public
utility” view of democratic legitimacy. And whatever else may
count as consent, surely the fact that the majority of citizens have
expressed their preference for a certain candidate, law, or policy is
an important source of democratic legitimacy as well.176 Call this
the “expressed preference” view of democratic legitimacy.
Consider public utility first. As we have pointed out, most contemporary democracies have thus far failed to address the emerging
problems of the Anthropocene.177 Consequently, the sense of physical and social insecurity grows more acute amongst citizens as the
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Scylla and Charybdis were mythical sea monsters mentioned by Homer in
the Odyssey. They were sited on opposite sides of the Strait of Messina between
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HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 157–68 (E. V. Rieu trans., Penguin Classics 2003) (c. 800
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(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/#
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ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/
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problems mount and compound.178 The legitimacy of these democracies, and the supranational institutions they have created, such as
the European Union and the United Nations, is thus compromised
on public utility grounds.
Now consider expressed preference. The global scope, longterm reach, unprecedented features, and highly complex nature of
climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene require democracies to make robust commitments to multilateral cooperation,
long-term planning, significant deviations from the status quo, and
increased reliance on expert knowledge if they are to succeed in
managing these problems.179 Citizens’ expressed preferences may
be quite distant from this network of commitments and activities,180
since the benefits of successfully managing a problem like climate
change would mostly accrue not to these citizens, but to spatiotemporally distant people (i.e., the global poor and future generations)
and genetically distant (non-human) nature.181 Attempting to force
such commitments, especially at a time when democracies are already being accused of not being responsive enough to their citizens,
can further compromise legitimacy.182
We thus face an apparent dilemma: if democracies fail to successfully address climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, their legitimacy will be challenged on public utility
grounds. If they aggressively attempt to address them, their legitimacy will likely be challenged on expressed preference grounds. Either way, we can expect the power of populist figures and movements to grow.
The remainder of this Part illuminates this dilemma by discussing how climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene
178
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See, e.g., BONNEUIL & FRESSOZ, supra note 7, at 5–7; Brannen, supra note
178.
182
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interact with some further democratic vulnerabilities: weak multilateralism, short-termism, the profusion of veto players, the contested role of experts, and self-referring decision making.
A.
Weak Multilateralism
Climate change cannot be successfully managed without a
strong commitment to international cooperation.183 For a climate regime to succeed, it must be effective, perceived as at least not unfair
by all parties, and otherwise acceptable to each party. 184 At various
times, the attempt to create a regime has foundered on each of these
three considerations.185
From the beginning of the negotiations that led to the adoption
of the FCCC in 1992 and in subsequent negotiations under the Convention, the question of fairness has been unavoidable.186 When
agreements have been structured in ways that are acceptable to developing countries (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) they have been perceived as unfair by the United States.187 This has led to the weakening of commitments and to a regime whose effectiveness is in question.188 The Paris Agreement, by putting voluntary pledges at the
center, was designed to avoid the problem of perceived unfairness.189 It was reasonably thought that no party could say that they
had been unfairly treated when they have agreed to be measured in
relation to a commitment that they have voluntarily undertaken and
to which no sanctions are attached for non-compliance.190 Nevertheless, that was exactly the claim made by President Trump in announcing his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris
Agreement.191 Moreover, the cost of creating an agreement to which
183
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185
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no one could reasonably object was to create an Agreement whose
effectiveness was in question even before the United States announced its intention to withdraw.192
While climate change is its own “full tragedy and weird comedy,” 193 there are structural issues at work.194 As the world order
attempts to adjust to shifting power distributions following the
emergence of new giants such as China and India, when it comes to
problems such as climate change the cooperation of such countries
is no longer just desirable but essential.195 As their collaboration becomes more valuable, the price for obtaining it rises accordingly.196
This complicates negotiations, and the problem seems only destined
to worsen because this logic applies not only to presently emerging
world powers, but also to those that have already emerged and those
that will emerge in the future. As we observed in an earlier paper,
“[g]lobal governance in the Anthropocene is cooperation-hungry,
and this increases the price of obtaining cooperation from every
country.”197
the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord.
192
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and nonhuman nature. Because they incarnate very different sets of interests and
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In addition, democracies have their own particular problems
when it comes to multilateral agreements. Except in the rare case
where they are able to steer multilateral agreements in the way they
prefer, democratic governments “often seek to avoid compliance
with binding multilateral decisions if this weakens their relationship
to their electorate.”198 This is in fact what happened in the case of
President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement.199 The stated
reason was the agreement’s unfairness to the United States.200 However, the deeper reason was that the Obama administration’s decision to join, although admittedly an act of national self-determination, was not in fact an authentic deliverance of American popular
sovereignty, at least in the eyes of Trump and his supporters.201 According to Trump,
[t]he Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that
disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers –
who [sic] I love – and taxpayers to absorb the cost in
terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories,
and vastly diminished economic production.202
In the same speech Trump reminded his audience that “I was elected
to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.”203
pursue different goals in different ways, it is inevitable that the agendas of these
agents can be mutually antagonistic. This lack of harmonization complicates the
already unstable relations among states. See generally id. To add more fuel to the
fire, as noted in Part II, governance in the Anthropocene also requires inter-generational cooperation in many domains, including climate change. See supra Part
II.A. Inter-generational cooperation is arguably even harder to secure than its intra-generational counterpart. See generally Gardiner, supra note 29, at 481–85.
198
David Held, Climate Change, Global Governance and Democracy: Some
Questions, in CANNED HEAT: ETHICS AND POLITICS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE 17, 21 (Marcello Di Paola & Gianfranco Pellegrino eds., 2014). For a
different perspective, see generally Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1, 1–5 (2009).
199
See Trump, supra note 191.
200
Id.
201
See id.
202
Id.
203
Id. Ironically, after President Trump’s speech, the Mayor of Pittsburgh
tweeted “Pittsburgh stands with the world [and] will follow Paris Agreement.”
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In democracies, it is ultimately citizens who empower their representatives to bargain and strike terms of international cooperation.204 Successfully addressing the problems of the Anthropocene
is likely to require unprecedented levels of multilateralism.205 Democratic states that attempt to rise to the challenge are likely to face
legitimacy challenges on expressed preference grounds. Those that
do not may face legitimacy challenges on public utility grounds.
B.
Short-termism
Short-termism can be defined as “the priority given to present
net benefits at the cost of future ones.”206 Short-termism is a problem
whenever policy domains have an extended timeframe, as is the case
with climate change and other systemic problems of the Anthropocene.207 In these cases, present net benefits may need to be curtailed
(through increases in taxes and regulations, for example) for the
sake of benefits that might materialize in the distant future. These
future benefits will then mostly advantage people other than those
who have borne the costs. Reasons for privileging the present in
these cases include pure time preference, uncertainty, and diminished or even null moral concern for those who might benefit in the
future.208 The temptation, then, is to eschew the costs of the required
policies and “pass the buck” to future generations.209

See Julia Jacobo, Pittsburgh Mayor Vows to Honor Paris Climate Accord After
Trump Invokes City in Speech, ABC NEWS (June 1, 2017, 5:48 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/pittsburgh-mayor-vows-honor-paris-climate-accord-trump/story?id=47777285.
204
See Ivo Wallimann-Helmer, The Liberal Tragedy of the Commons: The
Deficiency of Democracy in Changing Climate, in THE POLITICS OF
SUSTAINABILITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 20, 26–27 (Dieter Birnbacher &
May Thorseth eds., 2015).
205
See Michael Jennings, Climate Disruption: Are We Beyond the Worst Case
Scenario?, 4 GLOBAL POL’Y 32, 32, 37–38 (2013).
206
See, e.g., Iñigo González-Ricoy & Axel Gosseries, Designing Institutions
for Future Generations: An Introduction, in INSTITUTIONS FOR FUTURE
GENERATIONS 3, 16–20 (Iñigo González-Ricoy & Axel Gosseries eds., 2017)
(ebook).
207
Id. at 4.
208
See generally JAMIESON, supra note 5, at 105–43, 178–200.
209
See STEPHEN M. GARDINER, A PERFECT MORAL STORM: THE ETHICAL
TRAGEDY OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 148–59 (2011).
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Short-termism is not always irrational nor morally wrong.210 It
has been argued, however, that short-termism is both irrational and
morally wrong in the case of climate change.211 The sources of
short-termism are rooted in human psychology and can manifest in
any kind of political regime.212 However, it has been argued that democracies are particularly vulnerable to short-termism.213
One important reason for the short-termism of democratic political regimes is that these regimes inherit, via voting and other forms
of popular influence, their citizens’ biases in favor of the present.
Policies may also reflect citizens’ misinformation about, or unawareness of, long-term processes, risks, policy aims, and possible
outcomes.214 To counter these tendencies, liberal democracies typically filter their citizens’ inter-temporal biases, misinformation, and
unawareness through such mechanisms as constitutions and reliance
on expert bodies.215 Yet the more filtering they do, the more likely
they are to incur legitimacy challenges on expressed preference
grounds.216 This is a problem of intra-generational legitimacy.217

210

See González-Ricoy & Gosseries, supra note 206, at 5–6.
See, e.g., Simon Caney, Climate Change and the Future: Discounting for
Time, Wealth, and Risk, 40 J. SOC. PHIL. 163, 163–69, 181 (2009).
212
See generally Kym Irving, Overcoming Short-Termism: Mental Time
Travel, Delayed Gratification and How Not to Discount the Future, 19 AUSTL.
ACCT. REV. 278, 278 (2009).
213
See generally William D. Nordhaus, The Political Business Cycle, 42 REV.
ECON. STUD. 169, 181–89 (1975); Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules
Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON.
473, 473–75, 486–87 (1977); R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance,
6 J. PUB. POL’Y 371, 377–80, 318–84, 393–95 (1986); Alberto Alesina & Nouriel
Roubini, Political Cycles in OECD Economies, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 663, 663–
64, 683 (1992); Irving, supra note 212, at 288 (discussing short-termism as it applies in different corporate governance contexts); ALAN M. JACOBS, GOVERNING
FOR THE LONG TERM: DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT 3–5
(2011); Ronald R. Krebs & Aaron Rapport, International Relations and the Psychology of Times Horizons, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 530, 530–35, 541 (2012); González-Ricoy & Gosseries, supra note 206, at 11–14 (discussing various aspects of
inter-temporal problems of democratic policy-making).
214
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 244–88 (2007)
(discussing these shortcomings in relation to climate change).
215
See González-Ricoy & Gosseries, supra note 206, at 15–18.
216
See id. at 17–18.
217
See id.
211
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There are also problems of inter-generational legitimacy.218
There is no guarantee that long-term policies, if enacted, will
achieve the anticipated aims, or that they will indeed make future
people better off by achieving these aims.219 If things do not work
out, these policies might be deemed illegitimate on public utility
grounds by the very future people that they were supposed to benefit.220 In addition, such policies may be deemed illegitimate by future people on expressed preference grounds.221 Legitimacy on expressed preference grounds typically requires some form of
authorization by those who are affected by policies, yet future people who will be affected by past policies never authorize them, nor
can they hold anyone accountable.222
Another reason for democracies’ short-termism is the scheduling of participatory events.223 Democracy requires elections, which
must be relatively frequent in order to ensure that people can regularly express their will, vote out politicians who are judged to have
failed in some important ways, and prevent rent-seeking behavior
by not giving politicians enough time to set up camp within institutions.224 However, the relatively short duration of electoral cycles
ensures that politicians are constantly concerned with their own reelection, and this may prevent them from taking hard policy decisions that require a great deal of political capital and do not produce
appreciable outcomes in time for the next election.225 Because most
of the impacts of climate change will largely materialize in the future and be felt by future generations, efforts at their alleviation must
obey a clock that is not in sync with the electoral clock.
Note that there is no need to assume that politicians are always
and necessarily motivated by only a thirst for power.226 In a democ-
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Id. at 16–20.
Id. at 17–19.
220
See id. at 18–19.
221
Id.
222
Id. at 18.
223
See, e.g., id. at 15. See generally Apperley, supra note 158, at 167–168.
224
See, e.g., González-Ricoy & Gosseries, supra note 206, at 15.
225
See González-Ricoy & Gosseries, supra note 206, at 15.
226
See Jörg Tremmel, Parliaments and Future Generations: The Four-Power
Model, in THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABILITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 212,
212–13 (Dieter Birnbacher & May Thorseth eds., 2015).
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racy, even politicians who are exclusively motivated by the aspiration to make good long-term policy need to be elected or re-elected
to do so.227 In order to be elected, they need to harness the votes of
the current electorate.228 So, the problem of short-termism goes beyond a lack of conscientious far-sightedness on the side of politicians: it is structurally connected to the very fact of popular sovereignty—at least as long as the majority of people discount the future.229
C.
Veto Players
Any political system (with the possible exclusion of some forms
of anarchy) accords veto powers to some agent: a monarchy to the
king, an aristocracy to the nobility, a technocracy to the experts, a
theocracy to the religious leader, and so on.230 A veto player in a
political system can be understood as an agent who can prevent a
departure from the status quo.231 In democracies, veto players can
be specified by constitutions (e.g., the President and the Congress in
the United States), emerge from the political system (e.g., the Supreme Court in the United States, political parties that are members
of a government coalition in Western Europe), or from civil society
(e.g., powerful industries, unions or other interest groups in many
countries).232
In a democracy, veto players can protect minority interests, prevent destabilizing change, and preserve important values and policies through periods in which they are unpopular.233 More generally,
veto players prevent a democratic system from being excessively
fluid and flexible.234 This is attractive when the status quo is desirable or an exogenous shock is beneficial; however, when the status
quo is undesirable or an exogenous shock disturbs a desirable status
quo, fluidity and flexibility are needed in order to respond quickly
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See id.
Id.
229
See id. at 213–14.
230
See GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
WORK 17–19 (2002).
231
Id. at 19.
232
Id. at 17–19.
233
See id. at 149–53.
234
See id. at 19, 184–86.
228
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and decisively.235 This is arguably the situation in the case of climate
change, which demands nimble political responses to which veto
players would have to acquiesce.
The presence of many veto players threatens to delay or even
block the formulation and implementation of policy.236 Liberal democracies, with their reliance on checks and balances generated by
institutional architecture or by competition among interest groups,
seem particularly vulnerable to such threats—and the more veto
players in a democracy the greater the degree of vulnerability.237
An especially high concentration of veto players helps to explain
why a powerful, rich, technological leader like the United States is
uncannily slow to address consequential public issues such as the
politics of distribution, racial equality, immigration, the proper balance between liberty and national security, and of course climate
change.238 The United States Constitution separates powers in the
federal government, reserves a broad range of powers to states and
includes a bill of rights that can be viewed as effectively giving veto
powers to individuals in some circumstances. Practices have also
developed through time that inhibit action, such as requiring supermajorities for some political decisions.
The profusion of veto players may be extreme in the United
States, but it is a feature common to many liberal democracies that
often makes political action elusive even on relatively minor policy
issues.239 For every possible policy change, there is always a “donothing” alternative (sometimes more respectably presented as a
“wait and see” alternative) that is invariably attractive to some veto
player.240
“Do-nothing” alternatives may sometimes be justified on
grounds of rational choice considerations relating to transition costs
and uncertainty about both the process of transition and the final
pay-off structure.241 Veto players give voice to such considerations,
as well as other considerations that we have already noted.242 But
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

See id. at 185–86.
See id. at 19, 184–86.
See id. at 185–86, 189–90.
See, e.g., id. at 184, 189–90.
See id. at 184, 189–90.
See id. at 185–90, 215–18.
See id. at 215–18.
See id.
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veto players may also give voice to less rational tendencies, which
are inevitably present and, in democracies, are crystallized in votes.
Among these tendencies may be disproportionate attention to sunk
costs, finding refuge in “what has always worked,” fear of regretting
the changes made, the desire to maintain and transmit a sense of
control by not acceding to the demands of new circumstances, and
lack of trust in those who are proposing the changes.243
Veto players tend to slow down or block deviations from the
status quo, and this makes it difficult to tackle climate change and
other similar problems of the Anthropocene.244 But veto players also
reflect and configure real structures of power, and protect and promote the needs and interests of actual people.245 When the number
of veto players or the importance of specific veto players is altered,
new power structures emerge and this can raise legitimacy challenges on both utility and expressed preference grounds.246 It is not
obvious what veto players should be eliminated or demoted in order
to produce more nimble and effective climate policy, and which
ones should be given additional power instead. Nor is it obvious who
should decide the answers to these questions (if not the people) and
on what grounds (if not majority rule).
Veto players configure systems of checks and balances, filters
and buffers, which are only partially exposed to popular influence.247 This anti-majoritarian service is particularly precious to liberal democracies, which rely on veto players to protect and promote
the rights of individuals and minorities—and, with that, the core liberal principles of individual liberty and human rights. However, as
a consequence, if a majority exists that is overwhelmingly convinced by climate science, totally in favor of leaving all remaining
fossil energy sources in the ground, and ready to embark on ambitious renewable energy programs, this majority may still find it difficult to act. Liberal democracies protect minorities of various kinds
in varying degrees, and these include climate change denialists and
those who profit from fossil fuels. Economically powerful and en-

243
244
245
246
247

See generally Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 180, at 7–11, 37–41.
TSEBELIS, supra note 230, at 19, 184–86.
See id. at 161.
See González-Ricoy & Gosseries, supra note 206, at 17.
See TSEBELIS, supra note 230, at 185–86.
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trenched economic minorities (the “1%”) are often extremely effective veto players.248 This can prevent action that would benefit most
people, thus increasing the risks of legitimacy challenges.
D.
Contested Role of Experts
Climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene are unprecedented phenomena whose complexity and implications are
only beginning to be understood by scientists and other experts. Climate change is a multidimensional problem that concerns and connects ecology, demography, development, production, consumption, resource use, trade rules, health, security, urban planning, mobility, migration, and more, in novel ways.249 It poses threats that are
multi-scalar, probabilistic, indirect, often invisible, spatiotemporally
unbound, and potentially catastrophic. These threats challenge our
reason, emotions, and imagination.250 If there were ever a complex
problem that required expert knowledge, it is climate change.
Liberal democracies make significant use of expert knowledge
in policymaking in various ways to protect liberal values, and to
boost their efficiency, equity, and political stability. 251 Expert
knowledge is distinguished from non-expert opinion through such
criteria as experience, professional and educational qualifications,
peer-review, and rules of evidence.252
Still, in a democracy, differences in expertise do not translate to
differences in political authority, for much the same reason why differences in lineage do not translate in this way. A democratic citizen
can recognize expertise and accept the science of, say, climate
248
See generally NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF
DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM
TOBACCO SMOKE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 213 (2010).
249
See The Nature of the Problem, supra note 30, at 42–50.
250
On our cognitive, affective and imaginative limits when it comes to climate
change, see generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 214, at 244–88; JAMIESON, supra
note 5, at 8, 178–200.
251
See generally CHRISTINA BOSWELL, THE POLITICAL USES OF EXPERT
KNOWLEDGE 5 (2009).
252
Marissa F. McBride & Mark A. Burgman, What Is Expert Knowledge, How
Is Such Knowledge Gathered, and How Do We Use It to Address Questions in
Landscape Ecology, in EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND ITS APPLICATION IN
LANDSCAPE ECOLOGY 11, 13 (Ajith H. Perera et al. eds., 2012). See generally
MICHAEL OPPENHEIMER ET AL., DISCERNING EXPERTS: THE PRACTICES OF
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (forthcoming 2019).

414

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:369

change, and still object to the expert who counsels some course of
action: “You may be right, but who made you boss?”253 In a democracy, expertise is always subservient to the voice of the people (pace
Plato, philosophers cannot be kings).254
For this reason, the relationships between experts and ordinary
citizens are always potentially fraught in a democracy. These relationships vary from country to country, time to time, and issue to
issue. Often, the relationships are placid in good times and rocky in
hard times. Major policy failures, such as the global financial crisis
of 2008 and the spreading of terrorist radicalization in many European Union countries, can lead citizens to question experts’
knowledge and see them as just another interest group seeking rents
at people’s expense.255
In the case of climate change, an additional element makes the
role of experts potentially unpopular. Climate science, in our present
social context, inevitably provokes fundamental questions about
how we ought to live and organize our societies, throwing doubt on
the ways in which we do so now. A particularly powerful and widespread attempt to avoid cognitive dissonance through various forms
of rationalization may thus come into play. After all, if something
potentially catastrophic such as climate change can result from the
very ways in which we live our everyday lives—how we dwell, how
we eat, how we make things, how we move around—the nagging
thought is that there might be something fundamentally wrong about
the ways in which we live. These are not comfortable thoughts and
can lead to resentment or worse towards those who bear the message.
The incipient conflict and simmering resentment has been exploited by powerful interests who look to be the immediate losers
from a transition to a more sustainable way of life. They stoke the
dissonance and encourage denialism. The most obvious manifestation of this is the climate change denial campaign, directed towards
253
See generally DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 206–22 (2008).
254
See generally The Philosopher King, supra note 131, at 175, 175–263.
255
See generally Arnold Kling, The Era of Expert Failure, CATO POLICY
REPORT, Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 1, 1, 6, 8; TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE:
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT MATTERS 170–75, 179–88
(2017).
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preventing the formation of a consensus for political action on climate change.256
The main strategy of climate change denialists has been to suppress both belief in the science and belief that there is a scientific
consensus on the existence, anthropogenic nature, and dangerousness of climate change.257 In its aims and strategies, climate change
denialism has replicated earlier forms of denialism involving tobacco smoking, acid rain, DDT, and ozone depletion.258
The rhetorical techniques adopted by climate change denialism
have also not been particularly original: versions of these techniques
were used in all the other cases mentioned above. These techniques
include attacking sources rather than discussing evidence, “moving
the goalpost” by requesting ever larger amounts of evidence, submitting false evidence, suggesting false equivalences or analogies,
confusing ignorance about mechanisms or processes with ignorance
about facts or outcomes, cherry-picking anomalies, selective skepticism, quote mining, and the so-called “Gish gallop”—overwhelming discussants or audiences with unscientific claims to make it difficult to counter all the misinformation at once.259
256
See generally ROSS GELBSPAN, BOILING POINT: HOW POLITICIANS, BIG
OIL AND COAL, JOURNALISTS, AND ACTIVISTS ARE FUELING THE CLIMATE
CRISIS—AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO AVERT DISASTER xi, 37–41 (2004); ROSS
GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON: THE CLIMATE CRISIS, THE COVER-UP, THE
PRESCRIPTION 1–14 (Updated ed. 1998); ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 248,
at 169–215. It is important to see that expertise denialism is not the fallibilist
skepticism that is healthy for democracy in the ways celebrated by John Dewey,
Hannah Arendt, and Karl Popper. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN
CONDITION 1–6 (2d ed. 1998); 1 K. R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS
ENEMIES: THE SPELL OF PLATO 185–194 (4th ed., 1963); John Dewey, Thought
and its Subject-Matter, in 11 THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS: STUDIES IN
LOGICAL THEORY 1, 1–23 (Edward Capps et al. eds., 1903). In many cases, rather
than being skeptical about some widely believed and well-supported claim, a denialist asserts its contrary and tries to explain away the evidence for the claim on
the basis of conspiracy, deceit, or some rhetorical appeal to “junk science.” See
generally Charles N. Herrick & Dale Jamieson, Junk Science and Environmental
Policy: Obscuring Public Debate with Misleading Discourse, 21 PHIL. & PUB.
POL’Y Q., no. 2/3, 2001, at 11, 12–13, 15–16. In other words, a denialist can be a
dogmatist.
257
See JAMIESON, supra note 5, at 3–4, 61–104.
258
See generally ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 248, at 168.
259
Science Denialist Tactics, DEBUNKING DENIALISM, https://debunkingdenialism.com/critical-thinking/science-denialist-tactics/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).

416

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:369

What is new about denialism in the Anthropocene is not its strategies or tactics, but its amplification. Expertise denialism now travels through social media, which allows for unfiltered instant communication among citizens and between citizens and representatives. Traditional intermediaries—political parties, intellectuals, and
the professional press—are increasingly made redundant by these
technologies. Indeed, to maintain their relevance (and market share),
these traditional intermediaries often seek to replicate the immediacy and excitement of social media, compromising their own claims
to epistemological or institutional privilege.
One effect of the speed and directness with which political communication occurs through social media is an increased tendency to
brand political ideas and policy proposals and to market them as
products.260 The need to engage audiences with arguments and relevant facts—and even to maintain consistency in one’s opinions—
decreases, while the need for a good, resonant, quick-win pitch increases. With that, the importance of expert knowledge is downplayed to the advantage of skilled branding and marketing.
Another effect of the speed and directness with which political
communication occurs through social media is a polarizing fragmentation, not just at the level of policy judgments, but also regarding the sets of facts to which different individuals and groups make
reference. Social media allows for networked, yet highly fragmented, political communication, making it harder to individuate
and even debate a common story.261
Much empirical work in psychology, economics, political science, sociology, and communications has gone into trying to explain
how and why disagreement about facts can occur.262 The explanation seems to be some sort of “biased assimilation,” whereby people
See generally DAVE LEVITAN, NOT A SCIENTIST: HOW POLITICIANS MISTAKE,
MISREPRESENT, AND UTTERLY MANGLE SCIENCE 28–43, 96–110, 186–200
(2017).
260
See JAMIESON, supra note 5, at 87–91.
261
See generally W. Lance Bennett, Personalization of Politics: Political
Identity, Social Media, and Changing Patterns of Participation, ANNALS, Nov.
2012, at 20, 20–23, 28–29, 37–38. On the importance of a common story for democracies in the Anthropocene, see JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A
POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE 256–288 (2015).
262
See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 147–55 (2006); JONATHAN HAIDT,
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adjust their view of facts with reference to their self-defining values,
social identities, and partisan allegiances.263 Experiments on reception suggest that individuals selectively credit or dismiss information in a manner that reinforces beliefs congenial to their values.264 These experiments found that subjects were substantially
more likely to count a scientist as an authoritative “expert” when the
scientist was depicted as taking a position consistent with the subjects’ cultural predispositions, than when that scientist took a contrary position.265 Interestingly, these tendencies seem to be directly,
rather than inversely, related to levels of science literacy and general
education of experimental subjects: the more equipped people are to
know and understand the facts, the more they disagree on them.266
In times of social media, these tendencies may be amplified, insofar as individuals tend to gravitate towards and engage mostly
with resonant networks of “like-me’s” that by and large reaffirm
their own values and perspectives.267 This may tribalize positions
and impede constructive democratic engagement and debate from
ever taking off on many contested issues. In addition, one can expect
increasing polarization to also be fomented by individuals and
groups trying to secure loyalty to their branded political ideas and
policy proposals in this way.

THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND
RELIGION xvi–xvii (2012).
263
See generally CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS,
DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE
GOVERNMENT 4, 213–66 (2016).
264
See Dan M. Kahan et al., Letter, Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology, 4 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 87, 87, 89 (2009).
265
See Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J.
RISK RES. 147, 166–69 (2011).
266
See Dan M. Kahan et al., Letter, The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy
and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
732, 732, 734 (2012). We should be cautious, however, about this conclusion
since scientific literacy is defined in quite a general way in this study, while expertise about a particular area of science (such as climate science) can require
quite specific knowledge and skills that may not be available to many people who
are generally science-literate.
267
See Lawrence Lessig, How the Net Destroyed Democracy, TEDXBERLIN
(Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.tedxberlin.de/how-the-net-destroyed-democracylawrence-lessig.
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The internet and other media, with their seemingly endless resources, create the impression that expertise can be picked and chosen at will, thereby feeding the perception of public life as a spectacle.268 Public discussions, unfiltered by “moderators,” unfold in a
denuded space stripped of epistemological norms.269 In the United
States at least, this has morphed into a generalized atmosphere of
expertise denialism writ large. Denialism about evolution, vaccines,
economics, and more has become commonplace.270
It is not an exaggeration to say that we are on the verge of adopting epistemological nihilism as a public epistemology. 271 No commitment to facts, in the traditional sense, or even consistency of
opinion, is required.272 Truth is what the speaker says it is, here and
now. In a moment it may be different, depending on what the
speaker can get away with. In a democracy, it is up to elections or
approval ratings to resolve disagreements. It is a short step from here
to other exercises of power.
The nihilistic turn in public epistemology threatens the legitimacy of democracy, for democracy cannot solve the problems it
faces without mobilizing epistemological authority that is itself hostage to popular vote. As difficult as this challenge may be in favorable times, it is greatly magnified in the face of climate change and
other problems of the Anthropocene.

268
See NICHOLS, supra note 255, at 105–33; see also NEIL POSTMAN,
AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW
BUSINESS 3–15 (3rd prtg. 1986).
269
See generally POSTMAN, supra note 268, at 16–29.
270
See Stephanie Pappas, Evolution, Climate and Vaccines: Why Americans
Deny Science, LIVE SCIENCE: CULTURE (Jan. 21, 2017, 5:30 PM), https://
www.livescience.com/57590-why-americans-deny-science.html. Denialism may
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E.
Self-referring Decision-making
What we have elsewhere called the “agency presupposition” is
deeply entrenched in modern democratic theory. This presupposition holds “that the political community is constituted by agents who
initiate and conduct political action, and who themselves, and their
interests and welfare, are what matter politically.”273 The agency
presupposition arose at a time in which democratic principles, norms
and institutions were being developed to govern relations between
agents who lived in close proximity to one another in space and time,
and whose decisions and actions had relatively direct impacts on
each other. However, around 1950, a profound change occurred
from a world of discrete but interdependent states to a world of
shared social space in which distant events have localized impacts
and vice-versa. In this globalized world, the fates of nation-states
and their peoples became not just effectively interdependent, but
also structurally interconnected, with social, political, and economic
activities, interactions, and infrastructures stretching beyond political frontiers, leading to a deepening enmeshment of the local and
the global.274 Political decisions and actions taken locally (in selected powerful countries, many of which were democratic) now
systematically had planetary implications, impacting for better or
worse the welfare and interests of people in all corners of the world.
With the Anthropocene disruption of earth’s fundamental ecological systems, including those that govern climate, political agents
(living humans who can initiate and conduct political action) have
gained unprecedented power over a vast universe of non-agents that
comprises animate and inanimate nature as well as those living on
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the periphery of both space and time.275 The circle of affected nonagents has expanded beyond cultural, genetic, and spatiotemporal
boundaries to include virtually everything on the planet, now extended indefinitely in time.276 This establishes an enormous asymmetry of power. Those on the periphery, and nature, cannot initiate
and conduct political action: they cannot reciprocate, they cannot
participate, they cannot protest, they cannot retaliate.277 In democratic terms, they do not matter—or only matter derivatively, if political agents care about their fate. And it is as undemocratic as can
be, particularly if the democracy in question is a liberal democracy,
to force political agents to care if they do not.278
A phenomenon like climate change creates ubiquitous tensions
and trade-offs between agents and non-agents—those who are governed, and those who are affected.279 The latter will suffer most from
climate change, but a democracy responsive to the claims of future
generations (or those living beyond its borders, or nonhuman nature)
may often have to forgo opportunities for bringing beneficial consequences to those who empower it with their votes.280 Instead, democratic leaders would have to enact policies favoring the interests of
those who do not vote because they do not yet exist (or live in different countries or are not human).
Democracies making policies that favor non-agents will expose
themselves to intra-generational legitimacy challenges on both public utility grounds and expressed preference grounds.281 Even if the
expected benefits to non-agents were great, such non-agent-oriented
policies might not win the hearts, minds, and guts of living human
agents who may express their preference for themselves instead—
275
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particularly in democracies that are already being accused of not being responsive enough to their citizens.282 Many believe that ignoring or heavily discounting the welfare and interests of non-agents is
morally wrong, but if expressed preference is important, it may be a
wrong that democracies cannot avoid committing.283
The agency presupposition makes government responsive to
those who are governed but not to those who are affected beyond
borders in space, time, citizenship, or genetic make-up. A basic presupposition of liberal democracy appears to be threatened by the
very actions that would have to be taken to express concern for all
those affected by the climate-changing and eco-altering actions of
its citizens.
VII.

CONCLUSION

We began this Article by explaining the notion of the Anthropocene and briefly telling the story of failed responses to climate
change. We went on to discuss the uneasy relationship between climate change and democracy, focusing on liberal democracy in particular. We presented some basic aspects of democratic theory and
practice, and discussed some of democracy’s main vulnerabilities.
We showed how in the Anthropocene these vulnerabilities can magnify, leading to legitimacy challenges.
These legitimacy challenges are not new. Democracy has always
been haunted by anxiety about its future. Some political theorists
have argued that democracy is the only form of political organization that underwrites the seeds of its own destruction.284 Demagogues and extremists who wish to blow up the state are allowed the
same freedoms as those who seek to manage it more fairly and effectively. The risk of a democratically enabled democide is not an
abstract or counterfactual risk: the executioners of German democracy came to power through the rules and procedures of the Weimar
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Republic.285 If we open our eyes, we may see these stories going on
around us today.
Modern democracy is, in many respects, the most sophisticated
articulation of the human capacity for social organization. It is also
the most hospitable environment for the expression of human values
that, through centuries of emancipatory struggles, have come to be
regarded as fundamental, such as individual liberty and political
equality.286 Our objective in this Article is not to write a requiem for
democracy, but rather to chart the seas that democratic theory and
practice will have to navigate in order to successfully address climate change and survive the challenges of the Anthropocene. We
have highlighted the vulnerabilities of democracy in order to throw
in sharp relief the many challenges entailed by the voyage, not to
discourage it. Democracy has shown itself to be remarkably resilient
in the past, and it may well succeed in rising to these challenges as
well. There are those who think that democracy doesn’t stand a
chance.287 But many still believe that the only solution to the problems of the Anthropocene lies in more, better, or different democracy.288 And there are those who think that even if democracy fails
these challenges, democracy itself will not have failed. For they see
its value as intrinsic, and not just as a means to better or more effective governance.289
285
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It is difficult to sketch the nature of possible democratic solutions to some of the issues that we have raised, and we will not try
to do so here. Instead, we will close with a summary of what seems
to be the main challenge ahead. The existing democratic deficits in
liberal countries will generally have to be reduced. Yet, in the case
of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, liberal
democratic countries will have to muster both the internal coherence
and strength to better resist populism, and the external coherence
and strength to be more cooperative partners within the framework
of supranational institutions. This is necessary because, in the Anthropocene, the global spills into the domestic and vice-versa: a
globally changing climate may have pernicious local impacts on the
territory and population of any given country, while political dysfunction in one country can cripple efforts at global governance.
The democracies of the Anthropocene will have to work at multiple scales in both space and time, incorporating the interests of the
global with those of the local, and those of the future with those of
the present. This seems to suggest, perhaps paradoxically, that the
democracies of the Anthropocene will have to be more democratic
in some respects and less democratic in others. The relation between
popular sovereignty and institutions that limit popular sovereignty
while respecting it is a tug-of-war in democratic theory and practice
that has been going on for millennia, and is now being put to unprecedented tests.
Liberal democracies, in particular, have an enormous amount at
stake. Liberal political theory has always recognized the right to resist and even overthrow illegitimate political power.290 This right
has been used to justify historical events that liberals typically applaud, including the Glorious Revolution, the French Revolution,
and the American Revolution.291 Despite their failures and excesses,
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 213, 213–14 (Thomas Christiano & John Christman
eds., 2009).
290
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these revolutions forwarded liberal values and helped to entrench
them in institutions. Unable to find consistent responses to challenges to their own legitimacy in the Anthropocene, liberal democracies may be in danger of warranting revolutions against themselves and the very institutions that should realize their values. They
may become the ancient regime.

